



November 15, 2007 
Dear RGGI Board, 
 
ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”) and the New York Independent System Operator are 
pleased to comment on the RGGI market design, as described in the Final Report, 
“Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative,” October 26, 2007 (hereafter “Final Report”). ISO-NE is the private, non-
profit entity that serves as the regional transmission organization (“RTO”) for New 
England. ISO-NE operates the New England bulk power system and administers New 
England’s organized wholesale electricity market pursuant to the ISO New England 
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the Transmission Operating Agreement 
with the New England Participating Transmission Owners.  
The New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) is the not-for-profit 
corporation responsible for operating New York’s bulk electricity grid, providing non-
discriminatory access to transmission service and administering wholesale markets for 
electricity and transmission products in New York. 
To help in our assessment and understanding of the design issues of this critical market, 
we asked Professor Peter Cramton of the University of Maryland, a well known and well 
regarded expert in auction design, to comment on the market design. In addition to 
Professor Cramton’s widely-cited academic research on auction design, he has applied 
this research to design high-stake auction markets in many countries and industries, 
including markets for electricity and emission allowances. Professor Cramton’s 
comments are included as an attachment to this letter. 
We have studied the RGGI market, including the Model Rule, the Phase 1 Report, and 
the Final Report. We have also met with Professor Cramton and others to discuss the 
RGGI market design. We outline our consensus view, which is consistent with Professor 
Cramton’s comments on the RGGI market design. 
We agree with many of the recommendations of the Final Report, but believe that some 
require modification or extension to best achieve the RGGI objectives. We briefly 
summarize our views here, although we urge the RGGI Board and other policy makers to 
examine Professor Cramton’s paper for a detailed analysis and explanation. 
Most significantly, we recommend an ascending clock auction for each quarterly auction 
rather than the sealed bid auction recommended in the Final Report. The ascending clock 
auction is simple for bidders and has an excellent record of practical success. 
The ascending clock auction is similar to the recommended uniform-price auction, but it 
has important advantages. The main advantage is better price discovery. Bidders can 
learn from the bidding process and condition their bids on this information. In the RGGI 
context, it is proposed that two products, spot and forward, be auctioned in each quarter. 
The clock auction would allow the bidders to substitute between these close substitutes in   2
a single auction. Thus, any price difference is a reflection of the different market values 
for the two products. 
The problem with two separate sealed-bid auctions, as proposed in the Final Report, is 
that the resulting prices may be inconsistent with bidder preferences. Because of banking, 
the spot product is always worth as least as much to the bidder as the forward product. 
However, when separate sealed-bid auctions are conducted, the clearing price for spot 
may be less than the forward price. This can occur because the auctions are independent: 
bidders are not able to express that they always prefer the spot product if its price is lower 
than the forward product. With a clock auction this substitution can be easily 
accomplished.  
The Final Report recommends the sealed-bid design for two reasons: concern about 
potential collusion, and the absence of significant price discovery benefits of the clock in 
the experiments. Our view is that both the sealed-bid and clock formats have similar risks 
of collusion in the RGGI context, and therefore, the benefits of better price discovery that 
should favor the clock format. We note that the clock format tested in the Final Report 
was unusual in that it did not provide bidders with information on excess demand during 
the auction—absence of this information would frustrate price discovery. Moreover, 
intraround bids or exit bids were not included, which would reduce both efficiency and 
revenues. 
We recommend that a low reserve price be set, especially in the early auctions, when 
price uncertainty is greatest. Professor Cramton describes a simple method of setting the 
reserve price based on the history of clearing prices. In addition, we recommend that 
some supply response be included for prices close to the reserve price to provide greater 
price stability. Finally, it is desirable to allow other parties in addition to the RGGI states 
to offer supply in the quarterly auctions.  
In the event that some allowances go unsold, we recommend that the surplus be sold in 
future quarterly auctions according to a specific formula. Relative to an actively managed 
contingency reserve, a specific formula reduces political risk. Professor Cramton 
describes one simple method. 
The ISOs appreciate having this opportunity to comment on the RGGI market design. We 
have learned over the years the enormous benefit of good market design. Please let us 
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15 November 2007 
1 Summary 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cap and trade program to limit the total 
CO2 emissions from electricity sources in the ten member states on the East Coast from 
Maryland to Maine, excluding Pennsylvania. Each RGGI state has an allocation of emission 
allowances for each three-year compliance period. Sources must purchase these allowances in a 
sequence of auctions, such that on the compliance date, two months after the end of the 
compliance period, the source holds sufficient allowances to cover its emissions over the 
compliance period. The first compliance period is 2009 to 2011. This paper comments on the 
market design, and especially the auction design, as described in the 26 October 2007 Final 
Report (hereafter “Final Report”).
3 
The primary purpose of the RGGI market is to achieve an environmental goal—lower CO2 
emissions—at minimum cost. This is accomplished by assigning allowances to sources in an 
efficient auction, putting allowances in the hands of those who value them the most. RGGI also 
has many secondary objectives, such as transparency, neutrality, risk minimization, liquidity, 
simplicity, and consistency. In this context, auction design should emphasize efficiency, not 
revenue maximization, although to be sure, substantial revenues will result from an efficient 
auction. 
The Final Report makes sixteen recommendations on the RGGI market design. As shown in 
Table 1, I agree with most of the recommendations, but some require enhancement to best 
achieve the RGGI objectives. Fortunately, all of the enhancements are easily accomplished. 
                                                 
1 This paper was supported by ISO New England and New York ISO. I thank ISO-NE and NYISO staff for helpful 
comments. The views are my own. 
2 Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and Chairman of Market Design Inc. Over 
the last 20 years, he has published research on auction theory and practice in the leading peer-reviewed economics 
journals. During the last 12 years, he has applied this research in the design and implementation of auction markets 
worldwide. He has led the design and implementation of dozens of high-stake auctions in the energy and telecom-
munication industries. He has advised over 30 companies on bidding strategy in energy and telecommunication 
auctions. In 2002, he advised the UK on the design and implementation of the first greenhouse gas auction. Since 
1997, he has advised ISO New England on electricity market design, including the development of its forward 
capacity auction. In 2006-7, he led the design of Colombia’s firm energy market and its forward energy market. He 
received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University. 
3 “Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,” by Charles 
Holt, William Shobe, Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, and Jacob Goeree. I have also reviewed the RGGI Model Rule, 
the Phase 1 Report of 25 May 2007 (hereafter “Phase 1 Report”), and all the comments on the Phase 1 Report posted 
on www.rggi.org as of 15 November 2007.   2
Table 1. Recommendations of Final Report and proposed enhancements 
Final Report Proposed enhancement
1 Uniform price same
2 Sealed-bid Ascending clock with proxy bid
3 Separate auctions for each vintage Each vintage is separate product
4 Quarterly auctions same
5 Forward sales up to four years ahead same
6 Reserve price, publicly disclosed Supply curve, publicly disclosed, including 
aggregate of supply offers from participants
7 Unsold allowances either sold in next aucion or held in a 
contingency reserve account for late sale
Unsold allowances added to supply curve of future 
auctions according to specific market rule
8 Lot size of 1,000 tons same
9 Auctions open to anyone with financial qualification; quantity cap 
of 33% in each auction
same
10 Bids are binding contracts; quantity limited by financial guarantee same
11 Joint and uniform auction for allowances from all RGGI states same
12 Market monitoring should take advantage of existing activities of 
federal and state agencies, as well as other interested parties
same
13 RGGI should require that authorized account representatives 
disclose the "beneficial ownership" of any allowance holdings
same
14 Information for public disclosure includes the clearing price, 
identities of the winners, quantities won by each winner
In addition, the aggregate demand is disclosed for 
prices below the clearing price
15 Statement of Intent should be agreed to by participants same
16 Performance of the auction should be evaluated on an onging basis same
Recommendation
 
In contrast with the Final Report, I recommend an ascending clock auction for each 
quarterly auction instead of the uniform-price auction. The ascending clock auction is a simple 
auction process that has been used for many years to auction electricity, gas, emission 
allowances, radio spectrum, as well as other products. It is a dynamic version of the uniform-
price auction (or clearing-price auction), which is the most common sealed-bid method to 
auction divisible goods, like allowances. 
The primary disadvantage of the uniform-price auction in this setting is the potential to have 
prices for the two vintages (spot and forward) that do not reflect the bidders’ preferences. Given 
that each bidder must submit its demand curve in advance, the bidder must guess demands of the 
others for these two products. A wrong guess can lead to wrong prices. 
Consider the case of a bidder that needs 800 allowances. Suppose that either the spot or 
forward vintages would satisfy the need, since the bidder’s need is in the forward compliance 
period and allowances can be banked. Should the bidder bid for 800 forward allowances or 800 
spot allowances, or split its bid between the two? To answer the question, the bidder has to 
speculate about what the other bidders are going to do, since that is what will determine the 
clearing price in the two separate auctions. Often the bidder will make the wrong guess and buy 
some forward allowances, when the spot allowances are less expensive. With the clock approach 
the bidder is able to buy all its quantity at the less expensive vintage, consistent with the bidder’s 
preferences. 
An ascending clock auction is a simple and powerful dynamic auction that inherently 
addresses this shortcoming of the uniform-price auction. In each round, the auctioneer announces 
a price and the excess demand at the prior price. Each bidder then indicates the quantity it desires 
to buy at that price. In subsequent rounds, the price increases, and each bidder again expresses   3
the quantity it desires to buy at the new price. This process is repeated until there is no excess 
demand. Each bidder is awarded the quantity it bids at the clearing price. The format is readily 
generalized to handle multiple vintages and multiple sellers. 
The chief advantage of this approach is price discovery: bidders can learn about the demand 
of other bidders from the bidding process and condition their bids on this information. This is 
especially useful when there are multiple products, as is the case here where both the spot and 
forward products are sold at the same time. The clock auction allows bidders to substitute freely 
between spot and forward products, so that any price separation is a reflection of the difference 
in value of the two products. 
The enhanced price formation improves auction efficiency. To improve price discovery, the 
auction includes a simple activity rule: as prices rise, a bidder can only maintain or decrease its 
quantity. This prevents bidders from bid sniping—waiting until the last instant before bidding 
seriously. 
Some bidders, especially small bidders, may prefer to bid just once, rather than in a series of 
rounds. This is accomplished with a proxy bid. A proxy bid lets a bidder submit its complete 
demand curve in one step in the initial round, just as it would in a sealed-bid uniform-price 
auction. Alternatively, the bidder can take advantage of price discovery, and bid in a series of 
rounds. It is the bidder’s choice. 
The clock auction can be conducted in a single day (about eight rounds) or even half a day 
(about four rounds). The pace of the auction is readily managed through the bid increment 
policy. Larger bid increments are made possible without any efficiency loss through a common 
technique of intraround bids or exit bids, which effectively makes the discrete clock continuous. 
The Final Report recommendation of a sealed-bid uniform-price auction was based on two 
factors: a concern with collusion in the clock auction and the fact that the clock auction did not 
appear to outperform the sealed-bid auction in the experiments. This conclusion is unfounded. 
First, as I discuss later, collusion is unlikely to be a problem in this context. Second, the price 
discovery benefits of the clock auction were not seen in the experiments, because the 
experiments used a non-standard clock format that did not include the price discovery features 
essential to obtaining the benefits of a clock auction. To facilitate price discovery, clock auctions 
make public the excess demand at the conclusion of each round, and use either intraround bids or 
exit bids to improve revenues and efficiency. The clock format in the experiments included 
neither of these techniques, which have proven to be highly effective in practice. 
Importantly, the clock auction is easily extended to allow the auctioning of two products, 
spot and forward. The examination of this case is important, since it highlights an advantage of 
the clock approach and a flaw with using two separate sealed-bid auctions, as proposed in the 
Final Report. With a clock auction bidders can substitute freely between the two close 
substitutes. This guarantees that any price difference between the two products reflects the 
preferences of the bidders. 
The Final Report recommends the use of a reserve price, and I concur. In addition, I 
recommend an administrative supply curve that determines the quantity sold at various prices. 
For clearing prices above a low level (the typical case), the target quantity is sold. For low prices, 
the supply increases linearly to the target level as prices rise. The supply curve is flat at the 
reserve price, which is set at a low level based on the history of clearing prices. This supply   4
curve is intended to address insufficient competition or inadequate demand in a particular 
auction. As a result, it stabilizes the clearing price in unusual situations and mitigates demand-
side market power where one large bidder can purchase a large number of allowances for a low 
price when there is limited competition. However, it is not intended as a device to increase 
auction revenues. The starting price of the clock auction is the reserve price. 
I recommend that supply come not only from the RGGI states, but from market participants 
that have a surplus of allowances. These participants submit individual supply curves one week 
before the auction. The auction supply curve then is the sum of the administrative supply curve 
and the individual supply curves. This approach allows sources to rebalance positions in a liquid 
and transparent auction each quarter, similar to what is done with SO2 allowances. 
Market monitoring is important in addressing various collusive or manipulative strategies. 
To be effective, monitors need the information that might suggest a problem. For this reason, 
market participants should disclose the “beneficial ownership” of any allowance holdings. While 
the market monitoring units at ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM could be helpful in advising RGGI, 
Inc. and state entities as they plan for monitoring the RGGI carbon allowance market, the market 
monitoring function itself needs to be separate from the market monitoring units of the ISOs. 
The auction design described here is largely consistent with the Final Report. I have 
provided many details that are not addressed in the Final Report, such as how to set the reserve 
price and what to do with unsold allowances. My hope is that these remarks will be helpful in the 
further development of RGGI—a program that is especially important in that it will serve as a 
model for other jurisdictions. 
In what follows, I discuss the purpose of the market, the product design, the auction design, 
and finally the transition to the steady state. Throughout I compare my recommendations with 
those of the Final Report. I conclude this paper with my reaction to the comments of others. 
2  Purpose of the market 
The first step in any market design is understanding the objective of the market. Many 
objectives must be considered in the design of the RGGI market. These can be grouped into 
seven interrelated categories: efficient price formation, transparency, neutrality, risk 
management, liquidity, simplicity, and consistency. 
•  Efficient price formation. The market should produce reliable price signals based on 
market fundamentals. It should encourage the least-cost attainment of the environmental 
goal by putting allowances in the hands of those that value them the most. 
•  Transparency. The market should be highly transparent. It should be clear how the 
pricing and assignment was done, and why one bid was accepted and another rejected. 
The auction should result in prompt regulatory review and approval, and encourage 
regulatory certainty. 
•  Neutrality. All participants should be treated equally. 
•  Risk management. The market should minimize risks for market participants, yet be 
responsive to long-run market fundamentals. The market should shield participants from 
short-term transient events, and address counterparty risk.   5
•  Liquidity. The market should promote a transparent secondary market, including a liquid 
market for allowances in the current and next compliance period. 
•  Simplicity. The market should be simple for participants, for the market operator, and for 
the regulator. 
•  Consistency. The market should be consistent with the other key elements of the 
electricity markets in the RGGI states. It also should be consistent with, or improve upon, 
the best-practice in related markets. 
Fortunately, these objectives are largely complementary with one another. Hence, it is 
possible to design the market to satisfy all of these objectives. 
The Final Report included one objective not listed above: revenue maximization. Although 
it makes economic sense for allowances to be purchased as an incentive for actions to reduce 
emissions, the issue with what to do with the revenue is a policy debate for the states to decide. 
In any event, revenue maximization should not be an auction objective on par with the first seven 
objectives identified above. 
3 Product  design 
The second, and perhaps the most important, step of market design is defining what is being 
traded. This is the product design. 
Under RGGI, the product is an allowance for one ton of CO2 emissions from a source in a 
RGGI state during the vintage year or any year thereafter. An annual product is needed, since the 
compliance period, which typically is three years, may be extended by one year in the event of 
sustained high prices. This means that with the exception of the first three years, 2009-2011, it is 
not certain which compliance period a particular vintage applies to. Since banking is allowed, at 
any particular time allowance prices PY for vintage Y satisfy 
P2009 = P2010 = P2011 ≥ P2012 ≥ P2013 ≥ … 
The equalities follow, since it is certain that 2009-2011 allowances will all be in the first 
compliance period. The inequalities follow from banking, which makes earlier vintages 
superior—they can be used in the same compliance periods as any later vintage, and possibly 
more. 
Within three months of the end of the compliance period, each source must hold allowances 
that cover the source’s CO2 emissions during the entire compliance period. If a source has 
surplus allowances, these allowances may be banked to cover emissions in a later compliance 
period. The advantage of this structure is that it gives sources a great deal of flexibility in 
acquiring their allowances over time. This should reduce the cost to comply as well as the market 
risk and help assure system reliability by enabling generators the flexibility in acquiring 
allowances. 
Since CO2 is a long-term global pollutant, the allowance should be defined for as large a 
market as possible—all the RGGI states. 
4 Auction  design 
The third step of market design is establishing how the product will be traded. In the case of 
RGGI, this is the auction design.   6
The most important element of the auction design is improving price formation and auction 
simplicity by holding a single sequence of auctions for all the RGGI states, rather than separate 
auctions for each state. Since the product is the same for each RGGI state, and perfectly 
substitutable across states, there is no reason to separate auctions by state. Not surprisingly all 
commenters supported a single sequence of auctions for all states. 
As mentioned, I recommend an ascending clock auction for all the RGGI auctions. This is a 
simple auction process that has been used for many years worldwide for electricity, gas, emission 
allowances, radio spectrum, and other products. The approach is essentially a dynamic version of 
the sealed-bid uniform-price auction (sometimes called a clearing-price auction or single-price 
auction), which is the most common method of auctioning a divisible good. Figure 1 displays 
how the uniform-price auction works. Each bidder simultaneously submits its individual demand 
curve. The auctioneer aggregates all the demand bids and crosses it with supply to determine the 
clearing price. All bids above the clearing price win and are awarded quantity at the clearing 
price.
4 










The ascending clock auction is an especially simple and powerful dynamic implementation 
of the uniform-price auction. In each round, the auctioneer announces a price and the excess 
demand at the prior price. Each bidder then indicates the quantity it desires to buy at the current 
price. In subsequent rounds, the price increases, and each bidder again expresses the quantity it 
wishes to buy at the new price. This process is repeated until there is no excess demand. Figure 2 
depicts a clock auction, in this case with a vertical supply curve. The price rises until there is no 
excess demand; the bidders are then awarded the quantity they are bidding for at the clearing 
price P0. The format is readily generalized to handle multiple vintages and multiple sellers, 
which I describe below. 
                                                 
4 Other pricing rules, such as pay-as-bid pricing are possible; however, there is substantial theoretical, empirical, and 
experimental evidence that uniform-pricing should be preferred in this context. See, for example, Kahn et al. (2001).   7













The motivation for using a dynamic auction, rather than a sealed bid auction, is explained in 
detail in Cramton (1998) and Ausubel and Cramton (2004). In brief, the approach allows price 
discovery: bidders can learn from the bidding process and condition their bids on this 
information. This is especially useful when there are multiple products, as is the case here where 
both spot and forward products are offered in the same quarter. The clock auction allows bidders 
to freely substitute across spot and forward products, as I describe in detail later. As a result, 
market prices are achieved that are consistent with the bidders’ preferences. Any price difference 
between spot and forward reflects the extra value to bidders of the spot product’s greater 
flexibility of use. 
In contrast, if the two highly-substitutable products are sold in two independent uniform-
price auctions, as proposed in the Final Report, the outcome could easily be inconsistent with 
efficient prices. That is, the price of the superior spot product may be less than the price of the 
inferior forward product, even though all bidders value the spot product at least as highly. This 
price reversal, shown in Figure 3, can occur because a bidder is unable to express its substitution 
preferences between the two products with the independent sealed-bid format. Had the 
investigators of the Final Report conducted an experiment in which two substitutable products 
were simultaneously sold, this flaw in their proposal would have been identified. The potential 
for price reversal is mitigated somewhat if the sealed-bid auctions are done in sequence, but a 
much better solution is to allow the bidders to express substitution preferences during an 
ascending auction, as I describe in detail later.   8















Spot price < Forward price
 
One of the major insights of auction design over the last fifteen years is the importance of 
dynamic auction processes when auctioning two or more substitutable products. Simultaneous 
clock auctions have become the standard approach in such cases. The clock format includes all 
the benefits of a sealed-bid uniform-price auction, but in addition allows rich substitution 
possibilities across products. 
Clock auctions also tend to be viewed as more transparent and open than sealed-bid auctions 
and so, at the end of the day, the participants are likely to be more satisfied with an ascending 
clock auction than a sealed-bid auction.
5 
Although clock auctions are relatively new, they have already been applied successfully in 
high-stakes auctions in many countries and sectors, including the environmental sector. 
Applications have included electricity auctions in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Brazil, 
Colombia, and the US, and gas auctions in Germany, France, Denmark, Hungary, and Austria. 
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme Auction in 2002 used a clock auction for greenhouse gas 
emission reduction incentives, and the Clear Skies Bill in the US proposes a clock auction for 
SO2, NOx, and mercury emission allowances. Most RGGI market participants will already be 
familiar with the clock auctions as a result of major auctions that use that format in New Jersey 
(the NJ BGS auctions) and New England (the Forward Capacity Auction). 
The only potential downside of a clock auction compared with a sealed-bid auction is the 
clock auction takes time to run, which entails some cost for both the market operator and the 
bidders. This should not be a concern here, since the clock auction can easily be completed in a 
                                                 
5 The term “ascending clock auction,” is used here whereas the Phase 1 Report uses the terms “English clock 
auction” or “English clock auction with shootout round.” Ascending is more descriptive than English. The price 
clock ascends. Although “English auction” is commonly used for the oral-outcry auction (think Sotheby’s), even 
there the English are given too much credit, since the approach was used for many centuries before England even 
existed. The “English clock auction with shootout round” is best thought of as a particular implementation of the 
ascending clock auction describe below. The term “shootout” is misleading, since it suggests that the bidders can 
upset the results of the clock process in a final “shootout.” In fact, the bidders are tightly constrained by an activity 
rule, so the “shootout” is much less dramatic than suggested. Another good reason for not using the “shootout” term 
in experiments is that because “shootout” is such a dramatic term it could affect experimental results through 
framing.   9
single day (about eight rounds of bidding) or even a half-day (about four rounds). Moreover, to 
the extent that there are smaller bidders who do not wish to take advantage of the dynamic 
process, these bidders can submit all their bids at one time if that is what they prefer. This is 
called a proxy bid. A further simplification is to either allow or require bidders that are below a 
particular size to bid as “non-competitive” bidders. These bidders simply submit a quantity (or 
budget), and are awarded that quantity at the clearing price. This is commonly done in Treasury 
auctions to simplify the bidding for small bidders. 
I now address several other elements of the auction design: the auction schedule, the supply 
curve and starting price, the auction mechanics, and the secondary market. 
4.1 Auction  schedule 
The timing and frequency of the auctions can play an important role in price formation and 
risk management. The Final Report recommends quarterly auctions. This makes sense. Quarterly 
auctions allow a source to purchase allowances gradually throughout the compliance period. In 
addition it is recommended that the sale of each vintage be split 50-50 between spot and forward 
sale. 50% should be sold in four quarterly auctions during the vintage year, and 50% in the four 
prior years. The forward auctions allow a source to purchase allowances on a schedule that is 
more consistent with the source’s forward energy sales, which should reduce supplier risk. 
Forward auctions are also helpful for price formation, sending an early price signal one or more 
years in advance of the compliance period. 
Figure 4. Recommended auction schedule 
Y e a rQ t r 0 91 01 11 21 31 41 51 6 S h a r e
Aug 1/4 1/6 1/6 Spot 50%
Nov 1/4 1/6 1/8 Forward 50%
Feb 1/8 1/6 1 year ahead 1/8
May 1/8 1/6 2 years ahead 1/8
Aug 1/8 1/8 3 years ahead 1/8




















4 forward + 4 spot 
each vintage
 
Figure 4 shows a recommended schedule, which is a slight variation of the schedule in the 
Final Report. The difference is in the early years. In particular, the schedule above recognizes 
that it would be difficult or impossible to schedule auctions in advance of third-quarter 2008. 
Thus, only two auctions would be conducted in 2008 (August and November) with the forward 
sale necessarily compressed for the 2009-2011 compliance period. Beginning with vintage 2012, 
the sale would follow the steady state, with four forward and four spot auctions, each assigning   10
one-eighth of the total vintage. A similar schedule of forward and spot auctions has been 
proposed for Australia (see Australia National Emissions Trading Taskforce 2007). 
The first auction in August 2008 can take advantage of the fact that the 2009, 2010, and 
2011 vintages are perfect substitutes, since all three vintages can be used in the first and any later 
compliance period. The three vintages are auctioned with a single clock and bidders express 
demands for all three years combined. Each winner receives a blend of 2009, 2010, and 2011 in 
the exact proportion to the quantity of each that is sold. In this way, the auction enforces the 
perfect-substitute constraint that P2009 = P2010 = P2011.  
Similarly, the second auction in November 2008 would treat the 2009 and 2010 vintages as 
perfect substitutes. In addition, this auction would include the close but not perfect substitute of 
the 2012 vintage. Thus, this auction would be conducted as a two-product auction, as discussed 
below. 
Ideally, the timing of the forward auctions would correspond at least roughly with the 
pattern of forward energy sales. Participants then would be able to lock in carbon prices at the 
same time as forward energy prices. Although the schedule does not precisely match the pattern 
of forward energy trades, it should provide enough price information and liquidity to facilitate 
effective hedging strategies. 
4.2  Supply curve and starting price 
The supply curve determines the quantity that is sold at various prices. The Final Report 
recommends a supply curve that is horizontal at the reserve price and then vertical at the supply 
target. I show a slight variation in Figure 5, which includes some supply response at prices below 
the “response price.”
6 For prices above the response price, the full supply target (12.5%) is sold; 
at the reserve price only 80% of the supply target is sold; for prices from the reserve price to the 
response price, the quantity sold increases linearly from 10% to 12.5% as the price rises. 
                                                 
6 Supply response (sell more at higher prices) is the analog of demand response (buy less at higher prices). Demand 
response is helpful in mitigating seller market power; supply response is helpful in mitigating buyer market power.   11

















The supply curve does two important things: 1) it stabilizes prices across auctions by 
preventing the price from falling below the reserve price, and 2) it addresses the possibility of 
insufficient competition or inadequate demand in any particular auction by shifting some of the 
sale to later auctions in either case. By construction, it is likely that the targeted quantity is sold 
in each quarterly auction. In the event that the target is not sold, the shortfall is carried over to 
subsequent auctions. This approach is both simple and effective. 
Unsold allowances should be sold in future auctions according to a specific schedule, rather 
than put in an actively managed contingency reserve account. The reason is that the management 
of such an account could be highly political. Rather than reduce market uncertainty as intended, 
the contingency reserve may increase uncertainty by introducing political risk.  
A sensible deterministic rule is easy to construct. For example, unsold spot allowances could 
be carried forward to subsequent quarterly auctions with an upper limit of 1% of the total vintage 
per auction, unless the price is above the stage one threshold price, in which case all spot 
allowances are offered at the stage one threshold price. Figure 6 depicts this rule in the event of a 
3% surplus. One-third (1% of the total vintage) is added to the supply at the reserve price, and 
then the remaining two-thirds (2% of the total vintage) appears in the supply for prices at or 
above the stage one threshold price. Any surplus allowances are bundled with the spot product, 
since the products are perfect substitutes. Similarly, the sale of surplus forward allowances can 
be split among the remaining forward sales for the same vintage or included in the vintage’s spot 
auctions, if allowances went unsold in the last forward auction for the vintage.   12






















I propose setting the reserve price based on the history of prior auctions. Here is one simple 
approach. 
•  Let pt be the clearing price at time t.  
•  Let h1 be an estimate of the clearing price in the first auction. 
•  Let ht+1 be the history summary at time t+1, where ht+1 = (ht + pt)/2.  
•  Let dt be the reserve discount factor in year t, where dt = .05(1 + t) for t = 1,…,8, and dt 
= 50% otherwise.  
•  Let Rt be the reserve price at time t, where Rt = dt ht.  
Thus, the reserve price in an auction is a discount from the weighted average of historical 
clearing prices, where the discount factor is 1/10 in the first auction and then increases 5% each 
quarter until it reaches 1/2. 
With this approach the reserve price serves its important role of stabilizing prices, yet is 
responsive to market forces. If for some reason the reserve price is initially set too high, the 
reserve price in future quarters will quickly fall, and the clearing price will be determined on the 
vertical portion of the administrative supply curve: the target quantity will be purchased and the 
demand bids will determine the price, not the supply curve. The reason is that the reserve price in 
the future is never more than 50% of weighted history of auction prices; thus, the reserve price 
falls exponentially, when the reserve price is binding. 
The Final Report does not consider the possibility that market participants would be able to 
participate in the auction as sellers. This should be allowed, as it is in the US SO2 auctions. Any 
market participant holding allowances at the time of the auction can offer these allowances by 
submitting a supply curve one week before the auction. Individual supply curves should be 
piecewise linear and strictly upward sloping, as shown in Figure 7. Such a curve is specified with 
a sequence of price-quantity pairs, where as the prices rise, the quantities strictly increase. This   13
approach gives the participants ample flexibility in expressing preferences and facilitates auction 
clearing. 

























The auction supply curve, which is announced one week in advance of the auction, is simply 
the sum of the administrative supply curves from each state and the individual supply curves 
from each participant. Although it is possible for each state to have its own administrative supply 
curve, simplicity suggests that each adopt the same curve. The inclusion of sellers other than the 
RGGI states is also desirable. It does not complicate the clock auction and allows participants to 
sell surplus allowances in a liquid and transparent auction. The auction supply curve is piecewise 
linear and strictly upward sloping at all prices above the reserve, since each of these properties is 
inherited from the individual curves. 
The supply curve is simply a generalization of the reserve price that is used in nearly all 
auctions. The supply response helps address market power on the demand side. Supply-side 
market power is addressed by requiring that supply curves be submitted and published in 
aggregate form before the auction starts.
7 
For the ascending clock auction to work as intended, it is important for the starting price to 
be set sufficiently low that it creates significant excess demand. Setting too low a starting price 
causes little harm. It is competition among the bidders that determines the clearing price. The 
low starting price will quickly be bid up, unless there is insufficient competition, which is 
unlikely in this context. In contrast, setting too high a starting price can damage the auction. 
I recommend that the starting price be set at the reserve price—the lowest price on the 
supply curve. 
4.3 Auction  mechanics 
The clock auction is done in discrete rounds. There is one price “clock” indicating the price 
per ton for allowances for a particular vintage (or compliance period in the case of the initial 
auction). How the auction is extended to handle multiple products (spot and forward) is 
discussed below, but it is useful to first describe the mechanics for a single product. 
                                                 
7 Announced reserves are commonplace, especially in government auctions, and are recommended here. Secret 
reserves tend only to be used in private auctions where revenue maximization is a primary goal or where collusion is 
a particular concern as a result of limited competition (timber and oil leases).   14
In each round, the auctioneer announces: 1) the excess demand at the end of the prior round, 
2) the start of round price, and 3) the end of round price. Excess demand is reported in all clock 
auctions in practice to promote price discovery. In contrast, the clock auctions discussed in the 
Final Report omitted this important piece of information, which may explain why the clock 
experiments did not appear to have better price discovery. 
Since this is an auction to sell allowances, the clock ascends, so the start of round price is 
below the end of round price. Each bidder submits an aggregate demand curve at all prices 
between the start of round price and the end of round price. The auctioneer determines and 
reports the excess demand at the end of round price. So long as there is excess demand, the price 
increases. The price increment is determined by best-practice methods, essentially in relation to 
the extent of excess demand. If there is no excess demand, the auction ends and the clearing 
price is determined. 
4.3.1 Activity  rule 
An activity rule in a dynamic auction is intended to enhance price discovery by motivating 
each bidder to bid throughout the auction in a manner that is consistent with the bidder’s true 
interests. To the extent that bids better reflect each bidder’s true preferences, the process reveals 
more market-based information, improving price formation. This allows bidders to focus their 
decision-making attention on more realistic prices. This focus improves bidder decision making, 
especially with respect to costly information acquisition. Bidder participation costs are reduced 
and efficiency is improved if the bidder’s evaluation is guided by a price process that better 
reflects true market preferences. 
The need for an activity rule in a dynamic auction is seen in the tendency of sophisticated 
bidders in eBay auctions to bid snipe. Bid sniping is waiting until the last minute before 
submitting a bid. There are numerous reasons for this common behavior, but one of the most 
frequent is a desire to prevent other bidders from responding to your bid. If all bidders bid snipe, 
then the dynamic auction becomes a sealed-bid auction and the benefits of price discovery are 
lost. 
Fortunately, there is a simple and general activity rule, based on one of the basic principles 
of economics: revealed preference. Whenever a consumer selects one package over another, the 
consumer is effectively saying, “At these prices, I prefer this package.” The economist then 
infers this preference from the consumer’s choice. This is revealed preference: the consumer 
reveals something about her preferences through her choices. 
We can apply the same revealed preference approach in a clock auction. In each round of the 
auction, the bidder is given a price and is asked to select the quantity it desires. The bidder is 
effectively saying, “At these prices, I prefer this quantity.” The activity rule requires the bidder 
to bid consistently with this revealed preference throughout the auction. In the context of the 
RGGI auction, the activity rule is especially simple. 
Activity rule: A bidder can only maintain or reduce quantity as prices rise. That is, the 
bidder must bid a (weakly) downward-sloping demand curve throughout the auction. 
4.3.2 Intraround  bids 
An important feature in the clock auction is what is known as intraround bids: the ability to 
express a demand curve for all prices between the start of round price and the end of round price.   15
This feature allows better expression of bidder preferences without requiring too many rounds. 
This improves auction efficiency and lets the auctioneer better manage the pace of the auction. A 
further advantage is that the incidence of ties are reduced, making it likely that only a single 
bidder will be rationed at the clearing price. Allowing intraround bids or exit bids is a 
straightforward and general way of achieving the benefits of what the Phase 1 Report called a 
“shootout round.”
8 
























Figure 8 shows a tabular and graphical version of a bid in a round. In this round, the start of 
round price is $8 and the end of round price is $10. The bidder simply needs to state at which 
price, if any, it wishes to reduce its quantity from its start of round quantity of 14,000 tons. In 
this case, the bidder makes two reductions: the first at $8.70 to 12,000 and the second at $9.40 to 
9,000. The resulting demand curve in this case has two steps. 
The advantage of this approach is easily seen when one considers what would happen in a 
clock auction without intraround bids; that is, when a bidder only expresses its desired quantity 
at the end of round price. This is shown in Figure 9. The result typically is overshoot. In Round 
5, there is significant excess demand, but at the end of round 6 there is significant excess supply. 
The discrete clock process overshot the clearing price. 
                                                 
8 An exit bid is an intraround bid in which only a single quantity reduction and associated price is allowed each 
round. Exit bids are used in the NJ BGS auction; intraround bids are used in New England’s forward capacity 
auction and most other clock auctions in practice.   16





















The problem of overshoot is readily avoided by allowing intraround bids. This makes the 
aggregate demand curve much smoother and better reflects the bidders’ true demands, as shown 
in Figure 10. As a result, auction efficiency is improved. Importantly, since the prices of 
reduction are specified by the bidder, rather than the auctioneer, they represent true points of 
indifference, and can be treated as such. The approach results in a unique clearing price and 
exact clearing. 





































An alternative implementation of intraround bidding, called ex post intraround bidding, is to 
allow the clock auction to run without intraround bids until there is no excess demand at the end 
of round price (round 6 in the figure above). Then at the conclusion of round 6, the auctioneer 
informs the bidders that there is no excess demand at the round 6 price and asks for intraround 
bids for all prices between the round 5 price and the round 6 price. The intraround bids must still 
be consistent with the activity rule. This approach is nearly equivalent to the “English clock with   17
a final shootout round,” as discussed in the Phase 1 Report, except it uses uniform-pricing, rather 
than pay-as-bid pricing in the final round.  
There are two differences between standard intraround bidding and ex post intraround 
bidding: 1) the ex post version economizes on the amount of “intraround” bid information that is 
collected—it is only collected in the final round, and 2) the bidder has some extra information 
when it places its intraround bids in the final round; namely, it knows that this is the final round 
and can condition its bids on this information. 
The distinction between the two versions of intraround bidding is subtle. Based on theory 
and experience, I believe that the standard approach is apt to perform better on both efficiency 
and revenue grounds in settings like this one in which there is a strong common value element.
9 
The reason is that in the ex post approach when the auctioneer informs the bidders that there is 
no longer excess demand, this is bad news about the market value of allowances. As a result 
bidders rationally revise downward their estimates of value, resulting in a group of bidders 
reducing quantity at the minimum price. Thus, there is a greater likelihood of the auction 
clearing at the minimum price with many ties at this price. Both revenues and efficiency have 
been reduced in this case. In contrast, in a private value setting, whether a bidder revises its bids 
upward or downward will depend on the bidder’s beliefs about the bids of others.  
Since the RGGI setting is one with strong common value elements as a result of a liquid 
resale market, I recommend the standard intraround bidding approach. It should be emphasized 
that the experiments discussed in the Final Report relied on a version of the clock auction that is 
nonstandard and much inferior with respect to the important element of price discovery. 
Moreover, the experimental setting only included private value environments and therefore was 
ill-suited to identify the benefits of improved price discovery even if the standard clock auction 
was used. A more relevant setting is one with strong common value elements. In such settings 
the clock auction has been found to perform quite well (see, for example, Ausubel and Cramton 
2002). 
All high-stake clock auctions of which I am aware, with the exception of the Virginia NOx 
auction, have used standard intraround bidding. In practice, bidders find it easy to use and like 
the flexibility it gives them in expressing preferences and the higher efficiency it yields. Both 
standard and ex post versions are much preferable to a clock auction without intraround bidding. 
The Final Report provides little explanation for its chosen clock implementation. Indeed 
there is only this single sentence which provides any explanation: “The experience with the 
Virginia NOx auction and in other settings that we have reviewed suggests that it is best not to 
reveal the total number of allowances requested in each round” (p. 19). Missing from the 
discussion was the substantial experience with clock auctions, which have been used to auction 
tens of billions of dollars in assets in many countries. All have revealed excess demand after 
each round. The investigators concern is apparently with demand reduction, but this phenomenon 
is present in the uniform-price auction as well. Although it is true that some simultaneous 
ascending auctions have been vulnerable to tacit collusion (see, for example, Cramton and 
                                                 
9 A common value setting is one in which the bidders have the same value for the good, but that value is uncertain, 
and each bidder has a different estimate of the true value. A private value setting is one in which each bidder knows 
its own value, and the bidder’s value does not depend on the value of others. Most real auctions have both common 
and private value elements. In RGGI, the common value element is especially strong, because of a liquid market for 
resale in subsequent quarterly auctions or secondary markets.   18
Schwartz 2002), these auctions were characterized by 1) weak competition, 2) many products, 
and 3) the ability to engage in retaliatory bidding strategies. None of these elements is expected 
in the RGGI context. Most importantly, retaliatory bidding is not possible, since only aggregate 
bid information is provide, rather than individual bids. 
4.3.3  Auction clearing rule 
The auction ends when there is no excess demand. The clock ticks up while there remains 
excess demand. Thus, the auction will conclude when excess demand is zero or negative at the 
end of round price. The auctioneer then backs up the demand curve to determine the clearing 
price, where demand and supply balance. 
In the RGGI auction, it is desirable to facilitate clearing by rationing bids at the clearing 
price if necessary. In the typical case, clearing is reached (demand and supply balance) when a 
single bidder reduces quantity at a particular price. For example, a bidder might drop from 
20,000 to 15,000 at $10/ton, and clearing occurs (S = D) at 17,000. The bidder wins 17,000 tons, 
not either 20,000 or 15,000. Indeed, the bidder’s bid is interpreted as “at $10/ton, I am happy 
with any quantity between 15,000 and 20,000 tons.” The bidder buys 20,000 if the price is below 
$10/ton and buys 15,000 if the price is above $10/ton. Only when the bidder’s reduction is at the 
clearing price can the quantity purchased fall between the two quantities bid. 
In the unlikely event that there are multiple bidders on the margin (multiple bidders reduce 
quantity at the clearing price), then proportionate rationing is used.
10 Each receives its 
proportionate share. Thus, if one bidder dropped from 20,000 to 15,000 at $10/ton and a second 
bidder dropped from 40,000 to 30,000 at the same price, and if a total quantity of 51,000 is 
needed from these two bidders for the market to clear, then the two bidders are bidding between 
60,000 and 45,000 at $10/ton, and the first bidder wins 15,000 + 2,000 = 17,000 and the second 
wins 30,000 + 4,000 = 34,000. The second gets twice as much of the rationed quantity, since its 
reduction is twice as large at the clearing price. Alternatively, as is recommended in the Final 
Report, the orders can be filled in random bidder order. Such a rule has some competitive 
benefits under pay-as-bid pricing, but has almost no benefit under uniform pricing. The reason is 
that in pay-as-bid pricing, colluding bidders need to coordinate on price, whereas, under 
uniform-pricing, colluding bidders can coordinate on quantity. Proportionate rationing, as 
described here, is used in almost all uniform-price and clock auctions conducted in practice. 
In auctions with lumpy investments and without good secondary opportunities for purchase 
or sale, then rationing is not used. An example is the bid of a new resource in a forward capacity 
auction, as in New England’s Forward Capacity Auction. Here, however, the going-forward 
investments are not lumpy, and there are ample secondary opportunities for trading. Thus, 
rationing bids at the clearing price is appropriate. 
4.3.4 Proxy  bids 
Even with the auction conducted in a single day with just a handful of rounds, a small bidder 
may prefer to submit a single demand curve to be used throughout the auction, rather than 
participate explicitly in each round. This is handled as a proxy bid. The bidder has the option of 
                                                 
10 Multiple reductions at the same price are unlikely because of the use of intraround bids: the price of reduction is 
selected by the bidder from a fine price grid (cents per ton), not by the auctioneer. This is an important advantage of 
intraround bidding.   19
simply entering its demands at the beginning of the auction, just as in the uniform-price auction, 
or the bidder may submit bids iteratively as the auction progresses. Indeed, with proxy bids 
allowed, the ascending clock auction dominates the uniform-price auction for bidders. The 
bidders can treat the auction as a uniform-price auction or they can take advantage of price 
discovery if they find that valuable. 
4.3.5 Information  policy 
The information policy determines who knows what in the auction. I recommend that the 
supply curve and the starting price be announced before the auction. At the end of every round, 
the auctioneer reports: 1) the excess demand at the end of the prior round, 2) the start of round 
price, and 3) the end of round price. This is an anonymous auction in the sense that no individual 
demand bids are reported. Reporting of individual bids during the clock auction is undesirable, 
since it would introduce the possibility of retaliatory bidding, as a means to develop and enforce 
tacit collusion. 
4.3.6  Handling two products, spot and forward 
The examples and figures above are all based on a single product, as would occur in each 
spot auction if only allowances for the current vintage are sold. However, the Final Report 
recommends that both spot and forward allowances be auctioned at the same time. It is a simple 
matter to extend the approach to include two products, both spot and forward. The approach 
described here has been adopted for Colombia’s forward energy auction, see Cramton (2007). 
The first point to make is that the two products—spot and forward allowances—are 
excellent substitutes. The spot product is a superior good, since as a result of banking, it can be 
used in either the current or any future compliance period; whereas, the forward vintage may be 
in a later compliance period. Thus, we know that the spot price must be at least as great as the 
forward price. If participants expect allowance prices to increase faster than the rate of interest, 
then the spot price will approximately equal the forward price; otherwise, the spot price will be 
above the forward price. 
Because of the close relationship between the two products, it makes sense to auction both 
products simultaneously, and moreover allow the bidders to freely substitute between the spot 
and forward products. This is done by basing the activity rule on the bidder’s aggregate demand 
across both products: as prices rise, the bidder can only maintain or decrease its aggregate 
quantity (spot plus forward). The auction still has a single price clock, indicating the spot price. 
Bidders specify an aggregate demand as well as how the aggregate demand is split between the 
spot and forward products as a function of the price spread between the two products. 
Figure 11 gives a sample bid with two products, spot and forward. The first part of the bid 
expresses the bidder’s aggregate demand (both spot and forward) as a function of the spot price, 
for all prices from the start of round price to the end of round price. The bidder’s offer at the start 
of round price is carried forward from the prior round. The end of round price is specified by the 
auctioneer. The bidder simply has to express the prices at which it desires to reduce its quantity. 
In the example below, the bidder indicates that at a spot price of $7.30, it desires to reduce its 
quantity from 14,000 to 12,000, and then at a price of $7.80, it desires to further reduce its 
quantity from 12,000 to 10,000. Most clock auctions limit the number of steps that can be 
specified to five per round; this constraint almost never binds in practice.   20
Figure 11. Sample bid 
Bidder activity
Start of round prices and quantities $7.00 14,000
Reduces total demand to 12,000 $7.30 12,000
Reduces total demand to 10,000 $7.80 10,000
End of round prices and quanties $8.00 10,000
Substitution between spot and forward product
All All
spot forward




Carried forward from end of prior round
Set by auctioneer at end of prior round





The second part of the bid, shown in the lower box of Figure 11, is where the bidder 
expresses its substitution preferences between spot and forward products. In this example, the 
bidder is stating: 
1.  whenever the price spread—the difference between the spot price and the forward 
price— is less than $0.90, the bidder wants all its quantity to be spot; 
2.  whenever the price spread is greater than $1.00, the bidder wants all its quantity to be 
forward; and 
3.  whenever the price spread falls between $0.90 and $1.00, the bidder wants a linear mix 
of spot and forward product, according to the formula: 
spot quantity = total quantity × (1.00 – spread) / (1.00 – 0.90), 
where spread = spot price – forward price. 
This approach gives the bidder great flexibility in expressing its substitution preferences. For 
example, if the two products are perfect substitutes, then the bidder would give a single number 
for “all spot” and “all forward,” reflecting the bidder’s value difference between the spot product 
and the forward product. Then the bidder’s demand would be either all spot or all forward 
depending on whether the price spread is below or above the number bid. Alternatively, the 
bidder can slow the substitution across products by submitting a lower number for “all spot.” 
Then the bidder’s mix of spot and forward product shifts gradually to forward as the price spread 
increases.   21
Figure 12. The price spread is calculated to balance excess demand across products 
$/ton D/S ratio Spot Forward
Spread 1.37 120.0% Price $8.00 $6.63
Total market 800 800
Share auctioned 12.5% 12.5%
Supply 200 Amount auctioned 100 100
120.0% 120.0%
All All
Bidder Demand spot forward Spot Forward
A 19 $1.71 $2.20 19 0
B 19 $1.50 $2.00 19 0
C 14 $1.42 $1.80 14 0
D 48 $1.36 $1.60 47 1
E 29 $1.23 $1.50 14 15
F 38 $1.20 $1.40 6 32
G 10 $1.11 $1.11 0 10
H 24 $0.95 $1.20 0 24
I 29 $0.94 $1.10 0 29
J 10 $0.90 $1.00 0 10




Figure 12 shows how the price spread at the end of round price is calculated to balance 
excess demand across the two products. In the example, the end of round spot price is $8.00. The 
question is, “What is the price spread that results in the same ratio of demand over supply for 
both products?” In this case, given the aggregate demand of all the bidders, it turns out that a 
price spread of $1.37/ton results in a demand over supply ratio of 120% for both the spot and 
forward products. Given the strictly upward-sloping supply curves for both products, the weakly 
downward-sloping total demand curves for each bidder, and the linear substitution across 
products for each bidder, there will always be a unique price spread that balances the demand 
over supply ratio for each product. As the price rises and bidders make reductions in quantities, 
we eventually will reach the point where demand equals supply for each product. The motivation 
for calculating the price spread in this way is that it provides the best predictor for the price 
spread at the ultimate clearing price. The price spread is reported at the end of each round. 
For those auctions in which the spot and forward products are surely in the same compliance 
period, the two products are perfect substitutes with a price spread of zero. In this case, the 
bidding can be simplified to omit the price spread portion of the bid: ($0, $0) is assumed for all 
bidders. A winning bidder receives a mixture of the two vintages with proportions determined by 
the supplied quantities of each product. 
4.3.7 Internet  auction 
The auction should be conducted over the Internet using a standard web browser and 
industry-standard security. This approach reduces implementation costs, but more importantly 
reduces participation costs for bidders. 
4.4 Secondary  market 
To allow sources to rebalance positions, it makes sense to encourage a robust secondary 
market. Any party can buy and sell allowances in the secondary market subject to disclosure 
rules. In some settings, it is helpful for the market maker to maintain an organized secondary   22
market, such as when the secondary market is apt to be too thin or specialized for an informal 
secondary market to appear. In the case of RGGI, it is likely that a robust secondary market will 
appear, based on continuous trading in a bid-ask market. The secondary market is well-supported 
by the efficient pricing in the quarterly auctions. Buyers and sellers should be happy to trade in a 
secondary market with reduced price uncertainty, and therefore a smaller bid-ask spread. 
5 Transition 
A final step of market design is establishing the transition from the current state to the 
steady-state market. Often this involves early years with a different auction schedule or different 
quantities until the steady-state is reached. In this case, the transition may be especially easy. The 
only thing that requires modification is the auction schedule through the February 2010 auction. 
In particular, a more compressed auction schedule for the forward products is required, 
recognizing the fact that regulatory review and legislative action will make an auction before 
August 2008 difficult. I recommend that only two quarterly auctions be held in 2008 (August and 
November). 
With prompt attention to auction design approval, development, testing, and implementa-
tion, the auction should not be a constraint in this schedule. The design is straightforward. If, as 
can be expected from press reports, many of the RGGI states will be ready to participate in the 
first regional auction in third-quarter 2008. The first auction should be held at that time. I 
strongly recommend that a deadline be set in second-quarter 2008 for RGGI states to announce 
participation in the first auction. States that are unable to commit until after the deadline could 
include their allowances in subsequent regional auctions. Although a third-quarter 2008 start 
compresses the forward sales into a shorter time period, the late start in the initial year has two 
important advantages: it allows more RGGI states to participate in the first auction, and it allows 
additional planning and study to occur before the first auction, which should improve price 
formation. 
Some (Edison Electric Institute and Independent Power Producers of New York) have 
argued that even if 100% auctioning is adopted, it makes sense to phase it in over a period of 
time, beginning with 25%. The justification given is that a more gradual approach will be less 
risky. I disagree. There is nothing risky about 100% auctioning, and indeed, 100% auctioning 
likely reduces, rather than causes, some of the most common problems, such as hoarding and 
illiquidity. Plus this dual approach to allocating allowances requires the maintenance of two 
programs: 1) the auction program, and 2) another more costly program to determine how the 
non-auction allowances are allocated among sources. This substantially increases transaction 
costs for participants, as well as management costs for the governing agency. 
6 Collusion,  manipulation,  and market monitoring 
With a good auction design, there are many reasons to expect that the RGGI market should 
work well. Nonetheless, effective market monitoring is important to identify problems that may 
arise and to correct those problems before significant damage is done. The two most common 
problems that can be anticipated are collusion and manipulation. I discuss each. My discussion is 
preliminary as I have not completed an analysis of the market structure—the market share and 
portfolio of generating assets of the major market participants.    23
6.1 Collusion 
Collusion seems unlikely in this setting for several reasons. The market is only moderately 
concentrated. There are many market participants, each of different size and with a variety of 
generating portfolios and mix of fuel types. All the large participants are large companies, fully 
aware of the dangers of collusion. Most importantly, collusion is illegal. Violations can result in 
substantial fines (triple damages), loss of job, and potentially jail time. Bidding strategies in 
these large companies typically are determined by a bidding team that includes many people, 
including legal counsel and officers of the company. Many people within multiple large 
companies would need to coordinate bidding strategies in clear violation of the law. I find this 
implausible. 
Moreover, since only a small fraction of allowances are sold in any particular auction, 
collusion in any particular auction is readily undermined by the expanded purchases of non-
colluding buyers who find the low price attractive. 
Finally, the product is homogenous within vintage with rich substitution possibilities across 
vintages. There are no locational constraints and few timing constraints that might limit 
competition at a particular time and place. 
Collusion is much more apt to occur in auctions in which the same cohesive group 
participates regularly in auctions with weak competition, and where the individuals engaged in 
the collusive activity receive large personal rewards.  
The Final Report’s discussion of collusion is insufficient as a basis for the design 
conclusions it spawns. 
The report speculates about the greater possibility of collusion in dynamic auctions as a 
deciding factor in recommending a sealed-bid uniform-price auction over a clock auction. 
Although it is true that some dynamic auctions are vulnerable to collusion, a well-designed clock 
auction is specifically designed to mitigate collusion. This is done by enhancing substitution 
possibilities and by limiting information release to the aggregate information that is most 
relevant for price discovery. 
The experimental sessions specifically targeted to examine collusion found no compelling 
evidence of greater collusion risk with the clock format. Indeed, the clock format achieved 
higher revenues in the loose-cap case intended to magnify the possibility of collusion. The other 
collusion-enhancing case was allowing the bidders to communicate freely in a chat room, but 
only the sealed-bid formats were tested in this setting. Even so, the environment of six students 
able to freely communicate about bidding strategy, absent any antitrust laws, may not have 
realistically tested collusion in the RGGI setting. 
6.2 Manipulation 
Manipulation of the market by a single market participant may be a much more likely 
problem than collusion. Whereas collusion often is enhanced by bidder similarities, individual 
manipulations tend to be strongest in the presence of large differences among the bidders. In the 
context of RGGI, the primary concern is large market participants that have an unbalanced 
portfolio of fuel types. For example, the coal-only supplier or the nuclear-only supplier present 
particular challenges. The coal-based supplier has a strong incentive to keep the carbon price 
low, since the supplier is only partially compensated for its outlay in allowances. In particular,   24
the electricity price reflects the carbon cost of the fuel type on the margin in the spot electricity 
market. If gas is often the marginal fuel, then the coal-based supplier only recoups about one-half 
of its carbon outlay. In contrast, a nuclear-based supplier has no carbon outlays and so benefits 
from a high carbon price, since the electricity price increases based on the carbon cost of the 
marginal fuel type. The marginal fuel typically is gas on peak and in shoulder hours, and 
sometimes coal in off-peak hours.  
Two factors mitigate these problems. First, many large suppliers have a more balanced 
portfolio of generating units. Suppliers acquire resources with risk in mind. Holding an 
unbalanced portfolio is risky for suppliers. Second, while a supplier may be able to generate a 
short-term gain by either limiting or expanding its allowance purchase in one auction, that gain is 
offset in a later auction when the supplier is forced to take the reverse action to once again 
balance its position. 
There are still a few instances of potential concern. 
One would be an instance where the supplier is aware that the positive impact is short-lived, 
but nonetheless is beneficial. For example, suppose a supplier is spinning off its nuclear assets. 
Such a supplier may benefit from expanding its purchase of allowances in the auctions leading 
up to its nuclear sale, since the value of the nuclear assets increases with the expected future 
carbon price. The buyer of the nuclear assets may wrongly assume that the recent high carbon 
price is an indicator of high carbon prices in the future, and thereby overpay for the nuclear 
assets. 
6.3 Market  monitoring 
Market monitoring is important in addressing various collusive or manipulative strategies. 
For monitoring to be affective the monitors need the information that might suggest a problem. 
For this reason, I concur with the Final Report recommendation that market participants disclose 
the “beneficial ownership” of any allowance holdings. This allows monitors to look for 
imbalanced positions, which is often the clearest sign of potential manipulation.  
The market monitoring function for the carbon allowance market needs to be separate from 
the market monitoring units of ISO-NE and NYISO. Nonetheless, the market monitoring units at 
ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM could be helpful in advising RGGI, Inc. and state entities as they plan 
for monitoring the RGGI carbon allowance market. The expertise of Northeast ISOs in the 
analysis of behavior in electricity markets should be drawn upon in developing a carbon 
allowance-specific monitoring effort. 
7  Reaction to the comments of others to the Phase 1 Report 
This section provides comments to the main comments of others. 
100% auctioning is unprecedented and risky. 
Public policy makers need to decide whether 100% auctioning of carbon allowances is 
appropriate. However, government bonds, spectrum licenses, and oil rights are all auctioned, 
and 100% auctioning may reduce the chief risks of hoarding and illiquidity. An open and 
transparent auction minimizes the risk from hoarding and maximizes liquidity. 
The Phase 1 Report relies too heavily on experiments with students. Pilots with actual market 
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Most of the results of the experiments with students have strong empirical support from 
actual auctions with real participants. There is also strong support that bidding behavior of 
financially motivated students is largely consistent with that of experienced traders. 
Conducting experiments with actual market participants is not possible, since the incentives 
of at least some participants would be distorted by their desire to influence the auction 
design in a particular direction. However, it does make sense to conduct a mock auction with 
the actual bidders in advance of the first real auction. This is standard practice in high-stake 
auctions. Indeed, at least one month before the first auction, a bidder training session should 
be held, followed by a mock auction approximately one week before the first auction. The 
mock auction gives the bidders an opportunity to see exactly how the auction system works 
and confirm that there are no technical difficulties. 
Revenue maximization should not be the goal. 
Agreed. Efficiency should be the primary goal: putting the allowances in the hands of those 
who value them the most, and thereby minimize the cost of achieving the environmental 
goal. 
The auction should not have a reserve price. 
The auction should not have a high reserve price. High reserve prices are generally intended 
to increase auction revenues, and as I state above, that should not be a primary goal. 
The reserve price is important in avoiding a surplus of allowances, which may occur as a result 
of initial caps being set too high and declining too slowly. 
A modest reserve price is desirable, especially in the early auctions when price uncertainty is 
greatest. The purpose of such a reserve is not to increase auction revenues, but rather to 
address the possibility of either insufficient competition or inadequate demand in a 
particular auction for one reason or another. A modest reserve stabilizes the price in such 
circumstances and also mitigates certain manipulation strategies. 
As a result of a competitive market for allowances and the ability to bank allowances for 
future compliance periods, my expectation is that the auction price will exceed the reserve 
price in all but unusual circumstances. 
The auction should not be open to anyone, but should be limited to sources covered by RGGI. 
Financial participants generally play an important and useful role in markets by improving 
liquidity and price formation. Although a legitimate reason for limiting participation to 
RGGI sources may be a concern of manipulation by outsiders, it is extremely unlikely that 
the manipulation would be profitable in a regional auction. Profitable manipulation 
strategies are more apt to come from large RGGI sources (i.e., those with market power), 
rather than from outsiders. 
Manipulation is much better addressed through good market design and effective monitoring 
and enforcement, rather than exclusion of participants.  
Forward sale of allowances is important to manage risk. 
To best manage risk and improve price discovery, it makes sense to auction some portion of 
allowances in advance of the vintage. The sale of allowances should roughly conform to the   26
sale of energy. This allows the allowance cost to be included in forward energy contracts 
without any price risk. 
There are significant incentives for hoarding; thus, hoarding should be a main concern in the 
design. It will be important to simulate the impact of hoarding. 
Although hoarding is a possibility, there are not significant incentives for hoarding in the 
design proposed here. Hoarding is an exercise of market power. Market power chiefly is a 
concern with large suppliers who are able to take large positions and impact prices. 
First consider a large RGGI source. The incentive of the source works in the opposite 
direction. Rather than buying more than it needs, pushing the allowance price up, the 
supplier’s profit incentive is to buy less in order to keep the allowance price low. (See 
Ausubel and Cramton 2002.) 
Second consider a large non-RGGI source that desires to import into a RGGI state. This 
supplier might benefit from a high allowance price, but only if it is able to capture the 
congestion rent on the import path, say because it holds all the financial transmission rights 
(FTRs) or it is the only supplier with access to the path. However, given the large size of 
RGGI and the limited quantity of electricity that can be imported on any such path, it 
appears unlikely that the large supplier could impact the RGGI price sufficiently to make the 
exercise of market power profitable. 
Third consider a large supplier within RGGI that has a fleet dominated by low-CO2 emitting 
resources, such as nuclear and renewables. Such a supplier also benefits from a high 
allowance price, since it increases its profit margin. This case is more problematic than the 
importer case, since the supplier’s sale into the RGGI market is unconstrained by 
transmission limits. However, it is still the case that the supplier would need a large and 
fuel-unbalanced portfolio in order to make hording profitable. Fortunately, hoarding in this 
case is easily observed and mitigated in a transparent auction. 
It should also be noted that this problem of hoarding is not something that is limited to CO2 
allowances. Hoarding is an issue for all inputs to production. Indeed, the hoarding problem 
likely is greater for other inputs. RGGI is a deep market. Hoarding is much more effective in 
a thin input market, such as allowances for local pollutants, generation sites in load pockets, 
FTRs in load pockets, and gas contracts where gas transmission constraints are apt to bind. 
Cornering the market for CO2 allowances is even more foolhardy than the famous attempt 
by the Hunt brothers in 1980 to corner the silver market. Deep markets are not easily 
cornered. Moreover, RGGI is a deep regulated market that will be closely watched by 
market monitors. 
Rather than apportioning the quantity equally across the auctions, the quantity should be 
apportioned according to the load in the period. 
This would make sense if forward energy contracts were not important, but they are 
important. Nonetheless the idea that allowance sales should track energy sales is a good one. 
Given the anticipated liquidity of the market, it is not necessary that the tracking fit 
perfectly, but a rough tracking with the major tendencies of forward sale is desirable. 
An all-states regional auction is important to promote liquidity and minimize transaction costs.   27
Absolutely. On this point there is complete consensus. Ideally, there will be one product, 
one set of market rules, and a single sequence of auctions, covering all RGGI states. Such an 
ideal plan is readily accomplished with continued coordination of the RGGI states. 
The secondary market should be transparent, with sales and purchases posted. 
Transparency typically is desirable in markets. It improves price formation. In the case of 
CO2 allowances where there may be concerns about hoarding, transparency is especially 
desirable. Transparency through a central registry is readily accomplished at nearly zero 
cost. 
The initial auction should occur as soon as possible, ideally in first-quarter 2008. 
Although the first auction should occur early, there are important benefits to delaying the 
first auction to third-quarter 2008. The extra time can be productively used for additional 
planning and coordination among the RGGI states. It will enable as large a set of RGGI 
states to participate in the first auction. 
The ISOs should help monitor the auctions and market. 
The market monitoring function for the carbon allowance market needs to be separate from 
the market monitoring units of ISO-NE and NYISO. Nonetheless, the market monitoring 
units at ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM could be helpful in advising RGGI, Inc. and state entities 
as they plan for monitoring the RGGI carbon allowance market. The expertise of Northeast 
ISOs in the analysis of behavior in electricity markets should be drawn upon in developing a 
carbon allowance-specific monitoring effort. 
8 Conclusion 
RGGI may well prove to be a model program to limit greenhouse gas. The proposed 
approach as specified in the RGGI Model Rule and further developed in the Final Report will 
satisfy the goals of the program, especially if the further refinements discussed above are 
adopted. In particular: 
•  Efficient price formation. The proposed market will produce reliable price signals, 
especially if the recommended clock format is adopted, which greatly enhances 
substitution between spot and forward products. Most importantly, it will achieve the 
environmental target at least cost through the efficient auctioning and trade of emission 
allowances. 
•  Transparency. The proposed market is highly transparent. The auction results in clear 
pricing and assignment. Each bidder knows why it won or lost. Prompt regulatory review 
and approval is readily accomplished. 
•  Neutrality. All participants are treated equally. 
•  Risk management. Each market participant has great flexibility in timing its allowance 
purchase. This flexibility enables participants to minimize risk. Through this timing, 
exposure from short-term transient events is reduced. Counterparty risk is largely 
eliminated through the centralized auction. 
•  Liquidity. Market liquidity is promoted through the quarterly auctions of a single 
standardized product. Excellent price formation in the primary auctions should support a   28
liquid secondary market, but in any event the quarterly auctions provide ample liquidity 
for participants to purchase what they need. 
•  Simplicity. The market and auction are simple. There is plenty of experience with the 
recommended approach. The auction approach is not only simple, but well studied and 
understood in theory, in the lab, and in practice. 
•  Consistency. The market, especially the timing of auctions, is consistent with the other 
key elements of the electricity markets in the RGGI states. The recommended ascending 
clock auction is consistent with, or improves upon, the best-practice in other markets. 
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